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Whereas the previous chapter examined the policy’s primary elements (see Figure 3.1), this 
chapter focuses on the terrorism wing’s two secondary objectives (to prevent terrorism activities 
and further radicalization among inmates in the terrorism wing) and their corresponding 
instruments (extended security level and individual regime). Like in the previous chapter, this 
chapter firstly discusses whether the instruments are implemented as intended, and secondly 
whether the instruments produce intended and/or unintended mechanisms. Where possible, 
preliminary policy outcomes will be discussed.  
 
To examine the policy’s daily delivery several regime components will be analyzed, including the 
security level, control over internal and external communication, the level of association among 
the inmates, and daily routines. The extent to which intended preconditions are realized will also 
be discussed. To gain insight into whether and how the implementation developed over time, a 
comparison will be made between the implementation in the months after the terrorism wing´s 
opening (2006) and during the time of data collection (2010). This way, it is possible to identify 
potential unforeseen circumstances and examine their impact on the inmates and the daily 
functioning of the terrorism wing. The description of the regime will be based primarily on the 
situation in P.I. Vught, because only two prisoners have been housed for a relatively short period 
in P.I. De Schie. According to the two respective prison governors, the two terrorism wings were 








As became clear in Chapter Three, the decision makers intended to house the terrorism wing in 
an ´extended´ security level, which is one level below the maximum security level. The rationale 
is that the extended security level facilitates control over the inmates’ external communication, 
and thereby prevents them from plotting terrorism acts. In addition, the extended security level 
is supposed to contribute to order and security within the institution. 
 
2006 – Unit 1 
 
The (then) governor of the P.I. Vught, who was referred to by other decision makers as the 
‘architect’ behind the terrorism wing, played an important role in designing the intended regime 
type. According to the governor, the regime reflects a combination of the regime in the 
maximum security unit on the one hand, and a regime for exceptionally aggressive and 
disruptive inmates on the other hand.40  
 
In 2006, the terrorism wing was established in the temporary maximum security unit (Unit 1) of 
the P.I. Vught, an old building that had served as a concentration barrack during WWII. Within 
Unit 1, the terrorism wing encompassed two sections of respectively eight and ten cells. The 
courtyard had to be rebuilt in order to maintain the individual regime on the terrorism wing, so 
that five cages were constructed where inmates could be allowed to exercise simultaneously in 
separated areas.  
 
Unit 1 applied an ‘extended’ security level, which includes additional security measures to 
prevent (violent) in- or outbreaks and imposes substantial restrictions on inmates’ individual 
autonomy. When outside their cells, inmates are always guided by a minimum of two guards (see 
also Molenkamp, 2009). According to the applicable rules, inmates are frisk searched before and 
after each moment of contact between staff and prisoner. In practice, this means that inmates 
are searched each time they leave or enters their cells. Strip searches occur when inmates arrive 
at or leave the institution and after visits without separating glass walls. 
 
                                                          
40 Landelijke Afdeling Beheersgevaarlijke Gedetineerden (LABG). 
 The regime on the terrorism wing in Unit 1 was the subject of criticism by politicians and the 
media. The TV-documentary ‘Guantanamo Vught’ scrutinized the building’s old state and poor 
facilities. In 2007, the terrorism wing was temporarily displaced due to fire hazard. In June 
2007, the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) visited the terrorism wing 
and concluded that the building lacked sufficient climate control (CPT; 2008). In his reaction to 
the CPT´s report, the Minister of Justice announced the opening of a new unit in 2009. 
 
2010 – Unit 5 
 
In November 2009, the terrorism unit was moved to Unit 5, which houses the maximum security 
unit. Unit 5 consists of four wings of six cells each. Three wings are reserved for the maximum 
security unit, the fourth wing is allocated to the terrorism wing. In contrast to Unit 1, where 
communal areas are shared between different wings, in Unit 5 each wing has its own courtyard, 
kitchen, fitness room and recreational rooms. Unit 5 is especially designed to optimize all areas 
of the building. The building is light, modern, and equipped with CCTV systems and advanced 
technology that limits the need for correctional staff to interact with inmates. 
 
Unit 5 is tailored to house the maximum security unit, and therefore applies a higher security 
level than Unit 1. As such, when the terrorism wing was relocated from Unit 1 to Unit 5, the 
security level was automatically upscaled from an ‘extended’ to a ‘maximum’ security level. The 
rules and regulation that apply to the maximum security unit also apply for the terrorism wing 
and the same staff operate both regimes. According to the prison staff, the authorities never 
developed a tailored staff manual with instructions and procedures to manage inmates in the 
terrorism wing, although such a manual does exist with regard to the maximum security unit. At 
the time of data collection, this was frequently the subject of debate between staff and the prison 
directorate. On occasion, the lack of a staff manual caused confusion about the required 
procedure, for instance with regard to the treatment of (e.g., veiled) visitors. In most cases, 
prison staff relied on the manual of the maximum security unit. In the interviews, the prison 
staff emphasized the need to formulate a tailored staff manual and regulation for the terrorism 
wing, in order to identify and explain (to both staff and prisoners) as to how the regime on the 





 External Communications 
 
In order to prevent inmates in the terrorism wing from communicating extremist messages or 
coordinating or supporting extremist activities with others outside prison, their external 
communications are subjected to close control. Incoming and outgoing mail for inmates in the 
maximum security unit and terrorism wing are monitored by the facility’s Bureau for 
Intelligence and Security (BIV). Telephone calls and visits are audio recorded (and translated 
where necessary), and cues of extremist messages or illegal conduct are reported to the prison 
governor. BIV also monitors the inmates’ library use. The Prison Service developed a list of 
‘forbidden’ literature, which bans extremist or potentially radicalizing literature. Since 2002, BIV 
also investigates cues of radicalization among non-extremist prisoners in regular units, but this 




In the interviews, the staff indicated that procedures regarding control on inmates’ external 
communication have been strictly followed since the opening of the terrorism wing. 
 
When it comes to external contacts, a distinction is made between personal and privileged 
individuals. Privileged individuals, such as solicitors, are allowed to visit and freely communicate 
with the inmates. In addition, inmates are entitled to one personal visit a week. Personal 
contacts are vetted by the Detainee Intelligence Service before being allowed to visit. Inmates 
can forward ten persons for vetting; external contacts are not allowed to visit multiple prisoners 
in the wing. When deemed necessary, the prison authorities can decide to refuse personal 
contacts for a maximum of twelve months. Visits are always monitored by prison staff. 
 
The only element where the prison regime in the terrorism wing differs from the maximum 
security unit concerns visits behind glass. Whereas inmates in the maximum security unit always 
receive their visits behind a glass wall, inmates in the terrorism wing are granted the choice to 
receive their visits in a room without a glass wall. Shaking hands is permitted at the start and 
end of the visit. Inmates are strip searched before and after the visit; in case of visit behind glass 
the inmates are frisk searched before and after the visit. Interviews with both staff and the 
inmates revealed that in the first months after the opening of the terrorism wing, most inmates 




The staff indicated that the procedures regarding control on inmates’ external communication 
are still closely followed in 2010. However, one amendment has been made to the regulations 
concerning visits. After repeated requests from one of the inmates to permit physical contact 
between him and his children, the prison authorities allowed him five minutes physical contact 
at the beginning and end of a visit, every six weeks. Over the course of years the inmates 
increasingly opted for visits behind glass to avoid strip searches, which they experience as 
uncomfortable and humiliating.  
 
Level of Association 
 
2006 – individual regime 
 
The decision makers intended to subject the prisoners to an individual regime, which is 
supposed to prevent intensified radicalization and network strengthening by separating the 
inmates from one another. According to the prison authorities, within an individual regime in 
principle the inmates undertake out-of-cell activities, such as sport and recreation, on an 
individual basis. Association with others is considered a privilege, not a right. According to 
prison staff, in the first months after the opening the individual regime was strictly 
implemented, so that inmates spent most of the time in isolation and could not communicate 
with other inmates. However, in the interviews both the authorities and the prison staff pointed 
out that the isolation can negatively impact the inmates’ mental health, and that it was 
considered undesirable to impose the individual regime for sustained periods of time. A few 
months after the opening of the terrorism wing, prison staff allowed the inmates to associate 
during recreational hours in small groups of three to four inmates. Inmates who were charged in 
the same court case were kept separated and were not allowed to communicate.  
 
2010 – limited association 
 
Over the course of years, the level of association developed from an individual regime to a regime 
of ‘limited association’ (‘beperkte mate van gemeenschap’), which is also applied in the 
maximum security unit. Under a regime of limited association inmates undertake out-of-cell 
activities in groups of a maximum of four inmates. The prison governor has discretionary powers 
 to put inmates back on an individual regime when necessary, for example in cases of behavioral 






In the first months after the opening the prisoners in the terrorism wing were offered a basic 
program of daily activities. Prisoners were confined to their cells for approximately 21 to 22 
hours a day and would only leave their cells for one hour’s solitary exercise in an individual cage 
on the courtyard. They were entitled to exercise and shower twice a week under supervision of a 
sports instructor. Education or labor activities were considered incompatible with the individual 




After a few months (starting early in 2007), the prison staff gradually began to expand the range 
of activities offered in the terrorism wing. At the time of data collection, the inmates were 
allowed to spend approximately forty hours a week outside their cells. Between eight in the 
morning and five in the afternoon they were, within the constraints of the regime, relatively free 
to decide how to spend their day. Since the terrorism wing moved from Unit 1 to Unit 5 it has its 
own fitness room and recreational areas, which do not need to be shared with inmates from 
other wings. In addition, in Unit 5 all cells are equipped with a shower, so that inmates are no 
longer limited to two showers a week but can shower when they want. The terrorism wing also 
has its own kitchen; inmates are allowed to cook every day. For security reasons, only one inmate 
can use the kitchen at the time and although inmates often cook for each other, they eat 
individually in their cells. 
 
According to the prison authorities, the relocation from Unit 1 to the new and modern Unit 5 is 
the primary reason for these changes. Unit 5 is equipped with modern technology that allows 
inmates to move from one room to the other without physical intervention from prison staff. The 
staff encourage the inmates to spend as much time as possible out of their cells to prevent 
boredom and seek stimulating activities and interactions with other inmates. According to one 
respondent: 
 
 “I’d rather have them all standing outside in the courtyard or reading the 
newspaper in the recreational area, then to have them in their cells all day. 
When they are in their cells you have no idea what they’re doing or how they 
are. By giving them something to do you can stay in contact with them and 
prevent them from withdrawing in isolation.” 
 
According to the administrator of the terrorism wing, whether and how it is possible to offer the 
inmates a broader range of out-of-cell activities depends to a large extent on the population size. 
When the group of inmates is relatively small, the prison staff can more easily offer flexible daily 
routines within the constraints of the security level and regime than when the group is large. 
Since 2007 many of the inmates have been transferred or released; as of late 2008 the 
population size varied between four and eight inmates, which created possibilities to offer the 
inmates more activities and out-of-cell time. In addition, the administrator emphasized that the 
inmates’ behavior improved considerably as the group size decreased, which contributed to the 




Chapter Three described which preconditions the decision makers had in mind for the 
intervention to successfully contribute to realizing its objectives. In this section, I examine to 




As was done for the maximum security unit, the decision makers intended to install a Selection 
Advisory Committee (SAC) for the terrorism wing, to advise the selection official in decisions 
concerning placements and transfers of terrorism offenders. At the time of data collection the 
SAC had not been implemented, for uncertain reasons. However, a more informal focus group 
had been introduced, which meets monthly to discuss issues or problems on the terrorism wing 
and improve the daily functioning of the terrorism wing. The focus group includes the selection 
official, a representative of the detainee administration of the P.I. Vught, the director of Unit 5 
(which houses the maximum security unit and terrorism wing), the administrator of the 
terrorism wing, and representatives of the Public Prosecutor’s office and the Detainee 
Intelligence Information Service (GRIP). According to the (then) chair of the focus group, in 
 contrast to a Selection Advisory Committee, the focus group has no discretionary powers to 




The selection procedures describe a period assessment of inmates who have been allocated to the 
terrorism wing on the basis of selection criterion (c), expressing extremist messages. The 
intended aim of such period assessments is to evaluate whether the inmates’ stay in the 
terrorism wing is still necessary and goal-oriented. For inmates allocated to the terrorism wing 
on the basis of criteria (a) and (b), suspicion of or conviction for a terrorism offense, no period 
assessment was intended. Given that selection on the basis of criteria (c) has never occurred (all 
inmates have been selected on the basis of criteria (a) and (b)), no periodic assessments have 




Specialized training was intended for prison staff working on the terrorism wing. At the opening, 
the staff consisted of sixteen members. Prior to the opening, these staff members were offered a 
training module, which was developed and supervised by representatives of the Detainee 
Intelligence Service, Intelligence Service, and the Prison Service and aimed to enhance 
specialized skills to manage terrorism offenders. The training focused predominantly on 
knowledge about radical Islam and about the background and characteristics of the envisioned 
target population. In addition, the training included a ‘verbal judo’ module and elaborated on 
rules and regulations of the regime that would be implemented on the terrorism wing. Staff who 
started on the terrorism wing after the opening have not participated in the training. 
 
In addition, the Prison Service published an educational folder for all prison staff working in the 
penal system, in which staff are encouraged to be alert for signals of violent extremism among 
inmates. The folder provides behavioral guidelines for staff and identifies cues that may signal 
radicalization, such as rapid changes in religious beliefs or practices and changes in attitudes and 
behavior like frustration and fatalism, proselytizing, correcting other Muslims, etcetera. The 
folder focuses singularly on Islamist radicalization. On the back cover, the Prison Service 







Rehabilitation was explicitly rejected as an objective of the terrorism wing. As such the prison 
regime in the terrorism wing does not include elements that are aimed at rehabilitation. The 
program theory intends to transfer inmates to a more lenient regime in the final four to twelve 
months of their sentence, to facilitate increased levels of association and probation possibilities.  
 
In practice, detention phasing is not realized. Of the twenty-six prisoners who have been 
transferred from the terrorism wing only one spent the last phase of his sentence in a regime 
with a level of ‘limited association’. In contrast to the intended four to twelve months, the 
transfer occurred only two months prior to the inmates’ eviction. No rehabilitation programs 
were offered because, according to the prison authorities, the prisoner would be evicted after 
release. According to representatives of the focus group, most inmates did not stay long enough 




Despite the policy officially not accounting for rehabilitation efforts, the prison authorities and 
prison staff have aimed to introduce elements into the prison regime that promote a successful 
return into society. For example, during the time of data collection, the prison staff tried to 
organize Discmans for the prisoners so that they can listen to audiobooks.  
 
In addition, partly on request of the inmates, the inmates are provided the opportunity to obtain 
accredited graduate degrees from the Open University. At the time of data collection, four 
inmates participated in master courses in social science, management studies, and linguistics. 
Educational materials are provided throughout the institution and inmates are allowed to use a 
shared computer (without internet connection) to complete assignments. 
 
The prison staff ascribe great value to providing education, not only because it breaks daily 
monotony but also because education may contribute to de-radicalization and reintegration. 
According to the wing’s administrator: 
 
 “What is important, is to provide them with an abundance of books and 
magazines. This way, you can sow doubts. Because when you are at the train 
station ready to blow yourself up, you have got to be 100% sure that that is the 
right thing to do. If you have 10% doubts, I think you won’t do it. And by getting 
people interested in science, and by giving them education and some wisdom, 
perhaps it is possible to give them a different perspective on the future.”  
 
According to the administrator, the restrictive prison regime hinders the implementation of 
more rehabilitation efforts. Even small changes like providing Discmans are time consuming and 
require a series of bureaucratic procedures to be followed. 
 
The Inmates’ Perspectives 
 
In general, the inmates experience certain elements of the regime as severely restricting and 
drastic. Moreover, they feel unjustly treated and argue that the need to place them in the 
terrorism unit is not sufficiently substantiated by the government. Several inmates pointed out 
in the interviews that prior to being transferred to the terrorism wing they spent months in 
regular prison units, where they had significantly more freedom and could associate freely with 
other inmates and prison staff. Being transferred to the terrorism wing conveyed substantial 
losses in personal autonomy. 
 
One of the central themes that emerged in the interviews concerns the lack of privacy. Outside 
their cells, inmates are permanently observed. 
 
“The most difficult thing for me is the complete lack of privacy. It is just like ‘Big 
Brother’ here, but then for real. It scares me to think about that, it is not good for 
your mental state if you are continuously being watched and monitored. I try 
not to think about it, but you cannot ignore it.”  
 
In addition, the regular frisk searches are experienced as a drastic intervention. Most inmates 
receive their visitors behind glass to avoid being strip searched. One inmate talked about frisk 
searching:  
 
 “Especially the frisk searching is difficult, but you can’t get around it. Every 
day you are being touched all over your body, on all the intimate places. It 
makes me reluctant to leave my cell in the morning.” 
 
All the inmates indicated they were bothered by the fact that the prison staff write daily reports 
on them. In the words of one inmate: 
 
“They interpret every step you take here, and they write everything down. If 
they come at your cell and you don’t say good morning enthusiastically enough, 
they write down that you are in a bad mood today. If the next day you are again 
not enthusiastic enough they will start to wonder whether something is the 
matter with you. They assign meaning to behavior that often doesn’t have any 
meaning at all.” 
 
Another issue that came up in the interviews is the strict control on communication with 
personal relations. The inmates indicated that it is difficult to maintain personal relationships 
because all communication is closely followed. Family and friends are often reluctant to visit 
because they feel intimidated by the security procedures. In particular, the lack of physical 
contact is experienced as unjust: 
 
“Before I was transferred to the terrorism wing, I could touch and hug my wife 
and children when they came to visit me. That is no longer allowed since I am 
here. Simply because I am suspected of a specific type of offense they deprived 
me of my right to touch my children. If I had killed someone that would have 
been allowed, but I did not even use violence. I don’t think that is fair.” 
 
The inmates feel that the prison staff respect their religiosity. The inmates indicated that religion 
gives them strength to deal with the pains of imprisonment. The Friday prayer is important to 
them and they would prefer to pray collectively under guidance of an imam, but this is not 
allowed. Inmates pray individually in their cells. 
 
The interviews exposed that the inmates are gravely concerned about their future prospects. The 
regulations prescribe that they spent their entire sentence incarcerated in the terrorism wing, 
regardless of how they behave. The inmates perceive this as demotivating, because good 
behavior does not earn them anything. They feel stigmatized and expressed concerns that they 
 will face difficulties readjusting to life outside prison. In the documentary ‘Guantanamo Vught’, 
an ex-prisoner talks about his stay in the terrorism wing, and about his re-entry into society: 
 
“When I came out I couldn’t handle crowds, if someone spoke to me I did not 
want to speak to them, I did not feel like talking to people. I couldn’t handle it. If 
I went outside I couldn’t handle it, I just wanted to stay at home and lock myself 
up in my room.”  
 
Although the inmates experience the regime as harsh and drastic, they also see advantages in 
being detained in the terrorism wing. For example, the terrorism wing is much quieter than 
regular wings which house larger numbers of inmates. In the terrorism wing, the inmates can 
concentrate on their education and religious practices. For most inmates, education comprises 
an important element of their daily routine and gives them some confidence in the future and 
their reintegration prospects. One inmate claims that his study caused him to renounce violent 
extremist ideologies.  
 
The prisoners are happy with the move from Unit 1 to Unit 5. In the new building, the cells are 
more comfortable, there is more sunlight and each cell has its own shower. Moreover, the 
inmates can move from one room to the other without physical intervention from the prison 
staff, which reduced the number of daily frisk searches. The prison administrator confirms: 
 
“Because we can electronically transfer an inmate from room to room, they can 
participate in several activities in a row without physical contact with the 
prison staff, so that they don´t have to be frisk searched. Compared to Unit 1, 
the numbers of frisk searches probably reduced about eighty percent.”  
 
When asked whether they would prefer to stay in a terrorism wing or a regular prison wing, the 
inmates answered that they see advantages and disadvantages to both. On the one hand, being 
concentrated in a restrictive terrorism regime without individual risk assessment makes them 
feel stigmatized and discriminated. On the other hand, the terrorism wing allows them to focus 







This chapter examined how the terrorism wing’s security level and regime are implemented. In 
doing so I aimed to gain insight into whether and how threat-induced pressures on the policy 
context may have affected the policy’s implementation, and also in the extent to which the 
decision makers’ assumptions about how the policy is supposed to function are valid in the light 
of policy reality. The findings are in line with the findings of the previous chapter and indicate 
that the policy’s architecture seems a source of undesired outcomes, which – to the extent 
possible – had to be adjusted during the implementation phase.   
 
In general, the reconstruction of the terrorism wing’s daily functioning sketches a picture of a 
policy that is disproportionally balanced toward achieving instant security and leaves little room 
for differentiation on the basis of individual characteristics and needs, or for future-oriented 
security objectives. The policy accounts for an extended security level and a restrictive prison 
regime (which in practice turned out to be even more restrictive due to the terrorism wing’s 
allocation to the maximum security facility), in order to optimize control over the inmates’ 
behavior. In practice, however, it turned out that such restrictive confinement conditions caused 
several undesired side effects, such as serious infringements on inmates’ individual freedoms 
and a risk of eroded well-being as a result of the regime. Above anything else, the regime does 
not allow for efforts geared toward rehabilitation and reintegration, which triggered concerns 
among the prison authorities that the inmates would radicalize further during their incarceration 
or have poor reintegration prospects, possibly leading to recidivism.  
 
In an attempt to minimize undesired side effects, the prison authorities and prison staff have 
tried to add components to the prison regime with the aim to grant the inmates more individual 
freedom (e.g., more out-of-cell time than intended), avoid erosion of well-being as a result of the 
harsh confinement conditions (e.g., more interaction with other inmates than intended) and 
prepare them for their return into society (e.g., educational activities). In the first months after 
the terrorism wing was installed, fear and uncertainty about potential security risks associated 
with terrorism offenders dominated the practitioners’ perceptions and behaviors toward these 
prisoners. As time progressed these fears largely subsided; the staff perceived the inmates as 
‘model detainees’ and started to explore the ways to relax the prison regime. In practice, 
however, this turned out to be very difficult. The standardized and risk averse policy design 
appears incompatible with longer-term objectives and does not allow much room to tailor the 
regime to the inmates’ individual risks or needs and to incorporate elements that are geared 
 toward rehabilitation and reintegration. This outcome was perceived as problematic not only by 
the prison authorities and staff but was likewise recognized by the decision makers, who (in 
hindsight) stressed the importance of rehabilitation and reintegration objectives for terrorism 
offenders.  
 
In sum the findings of this chapter support the suggestion that emerged from previous chapters, 
that threat-induced pressures on the policy context negatively influenced not only the decision 
making process behind the terrorism wing but also shaped its implementation and daily 
functioning in undesired ways. As a result, critical questions should be asked about the policy’s 
ability to effectively contribute to preventing violent extremism among prisoners. Arguably, the 
policy facilitates control over terrorism offenders’ behaviors and minimized their behavioral 
freedom to participate in clandestine activities. At the same time however, it is wholly unclear 
whether and to what extent the policy is necessary or suitable to prevent prisoner radicalization, 
and the policy’s design causes several undesired outcomes, primarily that it fails to prioritize 












Based on the findings presented in the previous chapters, what can we thus far say about the 
expected use and value of concentration strategies as a means to detain terrorism prisoners? The 
study has provided insight into the underlying dynamics of the decision making processes as well 
as into the probability that concentration can adequately tackle the spread of violent extremist 
ideologies throughout the prison system.  
 
To begin with, the analysis of the Dutch policy, which was selected as a representative of similar 
approaches implemented around the globe, suggests that public and political fears of terrorism 
may play an important role in shaping such policies (Part One). In the Netherlands, societal 
anxiety and concerns at violent extremist ideologies resonating among Muslims put pressure on 
politicians and policy makers in ways that undermined sound reasoning and realistic appraisals 
of risks and available policy alternatives. It seems clear that the decision to segregate terrorism 
offenders from the remainder of the inmate population and subject them to restrictive prison 
regimes served important symbolic functions: the decision makers felt the need to quickly 
produce a prison policy that would not only prevent further terrorism attacks but would also 
obtain public and political consent by sending out a signal that the government is taking a 
decisive stance against terrorism suspects.  
 
Possibly as a result of the perceived urgency to satisfy public and political demands, combined 
with prevailing uncertainties as to the possible outcomes of different policy alternatives, the 
policy makers largely transferred the task of crafting the governments’ terrorism detention 
strategy to the practitioners. This meant that the prison authorities had a large say in defining 
 the policy’s architecture, which paved the way for lower bureaucratic-level fears and concerns to 
shape the envisioned objectives and instruments. This seems to have translated into the policy’s 
features: the policy response reflects a tendency to avoid risks (and blame) or ambiguities and is 
geared to establish a safe and secure prison environment.  
 
The concentration model seems largely rooted in the belief that inmates are susceptible to 
violent extremist ideologies and that the presence of terrorists in the broader inmate community 
conveys a risk of radicalization and recruitment. Is this really true? Over the past decade, much 
has been written on the risk of prisoner radicalization. Based on a review of relevant 
international research, I found that academic and empirical knowledge provides no support for 
the assumption that prisons are hotbeds of violent radicalization, nor that concentration policies 
can be an adequate solution to it (Part Two). If anything, the available knowledge seems to 
suggest that the perceived risk of prisoner radicalization may be vastly exaggerated and that 
´security-first´ segregation strategies can create further problems by intensifying grievances and 
frustrations that feed into violent radicalization. Problematically, given that research that 
empirically assesses the probability and dynamics of prisoner radicalization or the outcomes of 
different correctional policies is lacking, it seems as yet impossible to substantiate and justify the 
implementation of concentration policies on the basis of academic knowledge.  
 
In fact, the analysis of the Dutch policy provided further support for the idea that there is little 
evidence that concentrating terrorists is a necessary and useful way to prevent prisoner 
radicalization (Part Three). In the Netherlands, there is no objective indication that inmates who 
are placed in the terrorism wing indeed pose a risk of radicalizing or recruiting other prisoners 
and thus that segregating them is a necessary and helpful reaction. Between the installation of 
the concentration model (September 2006) and the moment of data collection (June 2010), no 
inmates have been sent to the terrorism wing on the basis of personal risk assessments: all 
inmates were selected on the basis of general criteria (terrorism charges). Whether they also 
pose a risk of proselytizing extremist messages has not been investigated. According to the 
prison staff most inmates behave as model detainees and displayed no signs of radicalization or 
recruitment ambitions; in fact, in some cases inmates were reported to de-radicalize and 
renounce violent extremist ideologies. However, whether this might be the case as a result of, in 
spite of, or unrelated to the policy remains an open question.   
 
The findings of Part Three suggest that external pressures on the policy context can influence not 
only the decision making process but also the implementation phase. In the Netherlands, policy 
 decisions that were made under pressure during the decision making process caused operational 
problems during the implementation phase, which could not be avoided without deviating from 
the intended policy. To a large extent such problems seem associated with the risk averse and 
standardized nature of the policy design, which leaves little room to tailor the implementation 
policy to the policy objectives or to situational circumstances where needed. For example, the 
decision to automatically allocate terrorism-related prisoners to the terrorism wing causes 
radicalized prisoners to be detained together with likeminded peers, which is perceived as 
undesirable by both the practitioners and the policy makers. In some cases, the practitioners 
deviated from the intended policy to avoid such outcomes.  
 
Even more, the Dutch case exposed yet another problem related to the concentration policy, 
namely that little attention is paid to rehabilitation and reintegration agendas, which may in the 
longer run increase the risk of post-release radicalization and recidivism. In the Netherlands 
rehabilitation is firmly embedded in the penitentiary act, which states that imprisonment should 
contribute to a peaceful reintegration into society after release. When it comes to inmates in the 
terrorism wing, however, the policy makers explicitly rejected rehabilitation as a policy objective 
and crafted a prison regime that focuses solely on acute threat reduction. This is not unique to 
the Netherlands: Neumann (2010) found that terrorism detention policies generally reflect a 
‘security first’ approach that does not emphasize rehabilitation. If it is indeed true, as was 
suggested in Part Two, that concentration may convey an increased risk of intensified 
radicalization and negative labeling of the offenders, then it might be that such policies 
ultimately give rise to post-release radicalization and recidivism and thereby possibly reinforce 
rather than thwart the threat of terrorism. 
 
In all, these results beg the question of what motivated policy makers to develop and implement 
concentration strategies for terrorism offenders in the first place, even though there is no 
evidence that such policies may be necessary or effective and that, on the contrary, the available 
evidence points in the direction of unwanted or even counterproductive outcomes? The findings 
presented in the previous chapters suggest that fear and threat-induced pressures in the policy 
context may offer an important explanation for this puzzle. Arguably, the socio-political 
conditions under which terrorism detention policies are created play a crucial role in shaping the 
ultimate policy design, in ways that seems to erode the decision quality and induce suboptimal 
policy making. In Part Four, I will subject this proposition to closer scrutiny and take a 
preliminary step to assessing whether and how threat and fear may shape the international 
policy debate on terrorism detention.  
   





















   
